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Abstract: 
Recently, the European Commission has made some significant steps towards the recognition 
of political party foundations at EU level. Firstly, it has agreed to acknowledge the political 
foundations as actors of European development policies. Secondly, it has launched a proposal 
leading to the creation of political foundations at EU level, linked to the European political 
parties. This article analyses the reasons, modalities and potential impact of this process. It 
focuses on the foundations’ network-building activities as a means to attain legitimacy and 
access to the EU institutions. To understand this evolution, two factors will be emphasised: 
firstly, the mobilisation of political entrepreneurs in the European Parliament lobbying the 
Commission and Council representatives; and secondly, the politically opportune context of 
rethinking EU Communication policy. This article contributes to bridging the gap between the 
analysis of European politics and policies. 
 
Keywords: European Political Foundations, EU, European Communication policy, European 
Parliament, European Commission. 
 
Résumé : 
Récemment,  la  Commission  européenne  a  entrepris  plusieurs  actions  en  faveur  d’une 
reconnaissance  de  fondations  politiques  (ou  proches  de  partis)  au  niveau  communautaire. 
Tout  d’abord,  elle  a  admis  que  ces  fondations  pouvaient  être  des  acteurs  légitimes  des 
politiques européennes d’aide au développement. Dans un deuxième temps, elle a lancé, en 
2007,  une  proposition,  conduisant  à  l’officialisation  de  fondations  politiques  au  niveau 
européen, liées aux partis politiques européens. Cette contribution analyse les logiques et les 
modalités de ce processus, tout en s’interrogeant sur son impact potentiel. Elle montre que la 
constitution de réseaux composés de fondations s’avère pour leurs responsables un moyen de 
renforcer à la fois leur légitimité et leur accès aux institutions européennes. Pour comprendre 
cette évolution, deux principaux facteurs sont mis en lumière : d’une part, la mobilisation 
d’entrepreneurs  politiques  issus  –  ou  proches  –  du  Parlement  européen,  orientée  vers  les 
représentants  de  la  Commission  et  du  Conseil;  d’autre  part,  le  contexte  politiquement 
opportun de reformulation de la politique européenne de communication. 
 
Mots-clés : Fondations politiques européennes, UE, Politique de communication européenne, 
Parlement européen, Commission européenne. 
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Publicly  financed  foundations  affiliated 
with  political  parties  are  a  challenging 
research  object.  Their  links  to  parties 
notwithstanding,  they  usually  enjoy  large 
autonomy. They develop policy ideas and 
contribute to agenda-setting, as well as to 
the  implementation  of  foreign  and 
development  policies,  especially  in  the 
field  of  Human  Rights  promotion  and 
democratisation aid.  
Concerning  transnational  support  for 
democratisation  processes,  American 
organisations  such  as  the  National 
Endowment  for  Democracy  (NED)  and 
similar institutes have triggered a growing 
research interest (Quigley 1997; Carothers 
1999;  Guilhot  2005).  In  Europe,  in 
contrast,  only  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  has  a  longstanding  tradition  of 
publicly  financed  foundations  affiliated 
with political parties, which stems from the 
Weimar  Republic,  and  developed 
especially after 1945. 
The  idea  of  creating  political,  party-
connected  foundations  has  gained  new 
ground in many European countries in the 
aftermath  of  the  Cold  War,  however. 
During  the  past  several  years,  national 
                                                 
*  A  revised  and  shortened  version  of  this  text  is 
being  published  under  the  following  reference: 
Dorota  Dakowska,  “Networks  of  Foundations  as 
Norm Entrepreneurs. Between politics and policies 
in EU decision-making”, Journal of Public Policy, 
vol. 29, n° 2, 2009. I would like to thank Wolfram 
Kaiser for his comments on the former versions of 
this  article,  as  well  as  Jean-Yves  Bart  for  his 
thorough linguistic revision. 
political  foundations  have  increased  their 
co-operation with the goal to gain official 
recognition by the European Commission 
(Commission). In the meantime, the role of 
political  foundations  has  been  formally 
recognised  at  the  European  Union  (EU) 
level  in  a  Regulation  dating  from  2007. 
These  recent  developments  have  not 
triggered  any  research  yet,  although  they 
provide evidence of the changing relations 
between  EU  institutions  and  networks, 
including  non-state,  political  party-related 
organisations. 
This  article  will  address  the  link 
between  the  growing  transnational  party 
and foundation co-operation, and European 
policy-making. Until now both fields have 
been  considered  separately.  Transnational 
political  party  networks  are  treated  as  an 
increasingly important (Hix 1995; Hix and 
Lord  1997)  but  still  largely  autonomous 
field  of  European  policy-making 
(Johansson 1997; Delwit, Külahci and Van 
de Walle 2001). European public policies, 
and  their  impact  on  the  domestic  level, 
have  been  analysed  mainly  through  their 
technical  and  regulatory  aspects.  Studies 
investigating the dynamics of lobbying in 
European governance have underlined the 
crucial  role  played  by  the  traditional 
sectors  of  interest  representation,  i.e. 
industrial,  professional  and  agricultural 
groups  (Mazey  and  Richardson  1993; 
Green  Cowles  1996;  Saurugger  2001; 
Bouwen  2002;  Coen  2007;  Eising  2007; 
Hamada  2007),  sometimes  adopting  a 
critical  perspective  (Michel  2005;  2007). 
While  the  contribution  of  public  interest 
groups  to  European  policy-making  has 
grown,  especially  in  agenda-setting,  the 
influence  of  non-governmental 
organisations  (NGOs)  is  limited  by  their 
lack  of  resources  (Dür  and  De  Bièvre 
2007).  The  position  of  political  party-
affiliated  foundations  at  EU  level  is 
distinctive,  as  they  do  not  fit  into  any 
category  of  what  has  been  termed  the 
‘European civil society’ (Weisbein 2003). 
The  eagerness  of  the  Commission  to  
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interact  with  organised  interests  was 
initially  limited  in  the  case  of  these 
foundations,  as  they  were  considered  too 
politicised  to  be  recognised  as  legitimate 
partners. 
Studies  of  European  governance  have 
highlighted the role of networks as a main 
feature  of  non-hierarchical  steering 
between  state  and  non-state  actors  at 
different  levels  (Kohler-Koch  and  Eising 
1999).  A  minimalist  definition  describes 
networks  as  a  ‘set  of  relatively  stable 
relationships which are of non-hierarchical 
and interdependent nature linking a variety 
of  actors’  (Börzel  1998:  254),  who  share 
common interests and exchange resources 
to pursue them. A policy network has been 
defined  as  an  entity  composed  of  both 
formal and informal institutional linkages 
between  public  and  private  actors, 
acknowledged by other actors and sharing 
interest  in  a  policy-making  field  (Rhodes 
1997; 2007; Pappi and Henning 1998). By 
stressing  the  ‘power  of  flows’,  most  of 
International Relations (IR) studies take for 
granted the fact that networks necessarily 
empower  non-governmental  organisations 
(True and Mintrom 2001). By looking at 
the  impact  of  transnational  (policy) 
networks, public policy analyses focus on 
the  study  of  policy  outcome  (Pappi  and 
Henning 1998). They are mainly interested 
in the ‘bargaining’ and ‘problem-solving’ 
of particular policy issues (Mayntz 1993; 
Le Galès and Thatcher 1995). 
In the process, these studies often fail 
to  explain  the  dynamics  of  political 
configurations,  resources  and 
opportunities,  which  enable  the  network 
members  to  impose  their  view.  Rarely  is 
the  question  asked  as  to  how  a  given 
network  was  formed.  In  his  critical 
reassessment  of  policy  network  analysis, 
Rhodes  (2003)  called  for  a  more 
empirically-grounded, qualitative approach 
to networks, which would ‘put people back 
in’.  More  recently,  he  developed  a 
‘decentred,  actor-focused  analysis  of  the 
games people play in the network’ (Rhodes 
2007: 1249). In order to take into account 
the  networks’  contingency  and 
differentiation,  this  approach  centres  on 
beliefs  and  practices  of  agents.  These 
beliefs and practices, shaped by traditions, 
may  change  when  actors  face  dilemmas 
(Rhodes 2007).  
Without  engaging  in  an  ethnographic 
‘thick  description’,  as  suggested  by 
Rhodes, this article adopts a sociological-
constructivist  approach  insofar  as  it 
acknowledges that networks are made up 
of individuals embedded in specific social, 
institutional and historical contexts. Some 
of  these  agents  share  beliefs  and 
worldviews  derived  from  their 
socialisation. Focusing on strategic uses of 
competing  visions  and  preferences,  the 
article emphasises the power relations that 
may exist within a configuration of agents, 
which resembles a network. It claims that 
non-hierarchical  and  horizontal 
relationships  do  not  exclude  contest  and 
domination.  Thus,  networks  are  usually 
embedded  in  broader  fields  in  which 
agents  struggle  for  the  imposition  of  the 
legitimate  vision  of  the  social  world 
(Bourdieu 1981).  
The  informal  networks  studied  in  this 
article  do  not  systematically  resemble  a 
narrow definition of a policy network; they 
come closer to an issue network (Rhodes 
1990). My contribution to network analysis 
is  twofold:  firstly,  the  article  fills  an 
empirical  gap  by  reconstructing  the 
existing foundation networks at EU level. 
Secondly, it goes beyond the approach of 
networks  as  problem-solving  devices, 
arguing  that  a  network  may  be  analysed 
both  as  an  expression  of  power  relations 
between  agents  and  as  an  organisational 
resource  in  tune  with  the  current 
expectations  of  European  institutions. 
Thus,  building  networks  appears  to  be  a 
way  for  the  political  foundations  to 
overcome  the  structural  resource 
inequalities between the different national 
political foundations – even if it does not 
prevent  conflict  among  them.  In  dealing  
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with the Commission, the foundations used 
the  existence  and  operation  of  their 
network  as  a  demonstration  of  their 
representative  character  and  political 
legitimacy.  
The  article  will  be  divided  into  four 
sections.  First  of  all,  the  introductory 
section  presents  the  objectives  and  the 
principal  hypothesis.  Furthermore,  it 
explains how the analysis of the foundation 
networks helps us understand the changing 
relationship  between  politics  and  policies 
at EU level. The second section synthesises 
the  involvement  of  national  political 
foundations  and  their  networks  in  the 
enlargement of European party families in 
the 1990s, and highlights the specificities 
of the German case. To solve the puzzle of 
the  formation  of  networks  of  political 
party-affiliated  foundations  and  their 
eventual  recognition  by  the  Commission, 
the  third  section  investigates  the  logic  of 
access and the progressive legitimisation of 
these organisations, as well as the role of 
conflict  within  and  between  competing 
foundation  networks.  The  fourth  section 
analyses  the  actors’  configurations  in  the 
European  Parliament  (EP),  the 
Commission and the Council, which led to 
the  creation  of  European  political 
foundations. Finally, the conclusion offers 
a critical assessment of the recognition of 
political  party  think  tanks  for  European 
governance. 
The article shows that the creation of 
European  political  foundations  was 
possible  due  to  three  main  factors:  the 
mobilisation of key leaders within the EP, 
the  lobbying  of  political  foundations’ 
networks and the Commission’s priorities 
in  renewing  its  political  communication 
strategy. This is based on recent empirical 
data,  mainly  qualitative,  semi-structured 
interviews and documents produced by the 
European  institutions,  the  political 
foundations  and  their  networks.
1 
                                                 
1  In  2007-8,  25  individuals  were  interviewed  in 
Brussels,  Paris,  Amsterdam  and  The  Hague, 
representing  the  political  foundations  and  think 
Ultimately, the analysis of the developing 
roles and activities of foundation networks 
at EU level has great potential for further 
investigation  of  the  nexus  between  the 
political party and regulatory dimensions, 
where  European  politics  and  policies 
interact (Smith 2004). 
   
Party  Foundations  in  the  EU  Political 
System 
 
Political  party  foundations  have  recently 
undergone  some  important  developments. 
First  of  all,  they  have  developed  more 
intense  co-ordination  among  themselves. 
In the early 1990s, the bulk of the newly 
created  political  foundations  experienced 
only  limited  networking  activities,  acting 
mainly  on  a  bilateral  scale.  Yet  with  the 
political transformation in the Central and 
Eastern  European  Countries  (CEEC)  and 
with the launch of the widest enlargement 
in  the  EU’s  history,  coordinated  action 
within  growing  European  foundation 
networks has become a rule. Most of these 
politically affiliated networks were linked 
to the emerging European political parties 
(previously  also  known  as  transnational 
party federations) and the political groups 
in the EP.  
Despite these links with the EP party 
families,  the  perception  of  political 
foundations  has  been  fraught  with 
ambiguity  at  EU  level.  While  vying  for 
support  and  recognition,  political 
foundations  have  long  faced  strong 
scepticism  from  Commission  officials. 
However,  owing  to  their  mobilisation  of 
the past several years, these organisations 
                                                                      
tanks  at  the  national  and  European  levels,  the 
European  Commission,  the  European  Parliament 
and  the  Europarties.  Previously,  during  my  PhD 
research  on  the  German  political  foundations,  I 
interviewed  more  than  100  representatives  in 
Germany,  Brussels,  Warsaw  and  Budapest,  from 
the political foundations and their partners abroad, 
the  German  and  Polish  parties  and  parliamentary 
groups,  as  well  as  the  federal  ministries.  To 
guarantee the anonymity of the interviewees, these 
interviews will not be cited.  
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managed  to  be  included  in  the 
implementation  of  the  EU’s  external  and 
development  policies.  On  18  December 
2007, European political foundations were 
officially  recognised  by  Regulation 
1524/2007  revising  the  2004  statute  of 
European  political  parties.  Regulation 
2004/2003  institutionalised  ‘political 
parties at European level’, providing them 
with a statute and EU funding. The 2007 
Regulation  was  meant  to  re-evaluate  the 
funding  of  European  political  parties, 
allowing them a more flexible use of EU 
grants  and  the  possibility  of  financing 
transnational  electoral  campaigns. 
However,  the  main  innovation  of 
Regulation  1524/2007  was  the  provision 
on  the  establishment  of  ‘political 
foundations  at  European  level’  and  their 
financial  support.  Previously,  in  a 
Commission proposal issued in June 2007, 
European  political  foundations  were 
defined as ‘catalysers of new ideas’ and as 
a means of strengthening ‘informed debate 
on  current  and  future  European  issues’ 
(European Commission, 27 June 2007 b). 
Faced  with  the  challenge  of 
communicating  increasingly  complex 
common  policies  to  the  public,  the 
Commission  officials  perceived  political 
foundations as a solution with the potential 
to  involve  citizens  in  the  process  of 
European  integration.  Moreover,  the 
Commission expressed sustained hope that 
these  foundations  could  increase  voter 
turnout  in  the  2009  EP  elections.  The 
empirical  demonstration  further 
investigates  the  contribution  of  leading 
members of the EP (MEP) and European 
federalists  to  strengthening  the  role  of 
Europarties  and  of  their  environment 
(Johansson and Raunio 2005).  
The provisions enabling the creation of 
European political foundations can be re-
analysed  in  light  of  the  role  of  political 
think tanks, which act as sources of ideas 
and policy options to bolster and complete 
the  work  of  political  parties  at EU  level. 
Initially developed in an Anglo-American 
political  context,  think  tanks  have  spread 
throughout  the  world  in  the  last  few 
decades,  shaping  public  debate,  defining 
problems,  and  acting  as  policy 
entrepreneurs  (Stone  and  Denham  2004). 
They may become agents of policy transfer 
as  they  enable  elite  networking  and 
information  sharing  –  through  regular 
interaction  during  the  agenda-setting  and 
policy  formulation  stages  –  and  provide 
scholarly  discourse  to  legitimise  certain 
policy options (Stone 2000). 
The  idea  of  stimulating  public  debate 
and to link party politicians and experts to 
a wider public illustrates the willingness of 
European  leaders  to  better  explain  and 
legitimise  European  policy-making 
through  political  party  channels.  This 
principle  is  prevalent  in  the  German 
political  system,  where  political  party 
foundations  act  in  at  least  three  ways: 
firstly,  as  think  tanks  that  deliberate  on 
general  values  and  specific  policy 
concepts; secondly, as educators inter alia 
providing scholarships and training future 
elites;  and,  finally,  as  agents  of  external 
and development policies. The decision to 
recognise  and  foster  political  foundations 
at  European  level  is  a  new  development, 
however.  While  EU-oriented  policy  think 
tanks have existed both in Brussels and in 
the  member  states,  for  the  first  time, 
European institutions have now decided to 
finance  party  affiliated  foundations, 
perceived  as  important  elements  of 
European  debates  on  policy  and  political 
issues. 
Consequently,  I  ask  whether  the 
creation  of  political  foundations  at  the 
European  level  may  be  considered  as  a 
case of lesson-drawing (Rose 1991, 1993) 
or  policy  transfer  (Dolowitz  and  Marsh 
1996,  2000)  from  the  national  level,  the 
German  model  being  the  main  reference. 
According  to  Radaelli  (2000),  the  EU’s 
institutional  context  facilitates  policy 
transfer,  in  the  form  of  mimetic 
isomorphism.  This  article  focuses  on  the 
agents  of  transfer,  the  rationale  of  the  
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process and its content, as well as its limits 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). According to 
Dolowitz  and  Marsh  (2000),  policy 
transfer  may  be  conceptualised  as  a 
continuum  between  lesson-drawing  and 
direct imposition, and cannot be reduced to 
a  complete  adoption  of  a  policy  model. 
Highlighting the political context and actor 
configuration  at  the  origin  of  European 
political  foundations  leads  to  the 
conclusion  that  policy  transfer  has  taken 
place,  albeit  one  constrained  by  the 
existing  institutional  and  legislative 
framework. 
 
Foundation  Networking  in  the  Context 
of the EU Enlargement  
 
The  term  ‘network’  has  become  a  buzz-
word  in  the  European  public  sphere. 
Recently,  the  political  foundations  have 
joined in this trend insisting on ‘networks’ 
as  a  basic  form  of  their  organisation. 
However,  while  investigating  the 
relationship between different foundations, 
one may ask whether there is evidence of a 
stabilised  and  ‘ever  closer’  co-operation 
between them. To what extent can we find 
evidence  of  the  foundations’  collective 
action  at  the  European  level?  Can  we 
distinguish  any  strong  or  weak  links 
between  the  different  partners?  Or  is  the 
image  of  a  network  instead  a  rhetorical 
tool,  a  necessary  argument  in  the 
foundations’  strategy  aimed  at  obtaining 
legitimacy at EU level? 
Most  of  the  European  party 
foundations,  left  and  right,  were  set  up 
after the fall of the communist regimes in 
the CEEC (cf. Dakowska 2009). The Jean 
Jaurès Foundation (FJJ), created in 1992, 
acknowledges the German paternity of its 
organisational  form:  ‘The  system  of 
political  foundations  stems,  in  Europe, 
from the year 1925 with the creation, by 
the  German  SPD,  of  the  Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung’  (FES)  (FJJ,  2007).  Created  in 
1991,  the  French  Robert  Schuman 
Foundation  was  entrusted  with  the 
objectives  of  promoting  democracy  and 
European  integration  in  the  member, 
candidate  and  neighbouring  states  of  the 
EU (Schuman Foundation, 2008). In 1992, 
the  Westminster  Foundation  for 
Democracy  (WFD)  was  created  in  the 
United Kingdom. 
The  networking  activities  of  these 
political foundations were enhanced in the 
context of the EU’s Eastern enlargement. 
The  first  initiatives  of  pooling  resources 
were attempted in the 1990s, mainly under 
the auspices of the European transnational 
party  federations.  By  analysing  the 
networks  of  foundations,  one  should 
acknowledge  their  strong  heterogeneity. 
The rationale of the political foundations is 
that properly functioning political parties, 
media and political institutions are key to 
an effective pluralist democracy. However, 
there are different ways to implement this 
strategy.  A  major  difference  between  the 
political  foundations  is  the  distance  from 
party structures, both at home and abroad. 
Some foundations acknowledge their close 
ties  with  political  parties,  even  if  they 
underline  their  autonomy.  Others  deny 
being  linked  with  a  political  party, 
although  the  ideological  profiles  of  their 
founders or their administrative board may 
reveal political party connections. 
The  German  political  foundations  are 
interesting case studies for the analysis of 
transnational  networks  and  informal 
politics  in  Europe.  Their  involvement  in 
the transnational promotion of democracy 
and  their  resources  are  unparalleled  in 
most  other  European  foundations.  They 
occupy  a  strategic  position  between  the 
political party and administrative fields in 
Germany,  and  have  long  been  involved 
with the federal foreign and development 
policies  (Ortuño  Anaya  2002;  Pinto-
Duschinsky  1996;  Wagner  1994). 
Furthermore, in the CEEC, the foundations 
have  accumulated  and  developed 
considerable  political  contacts  abroad, 
notably  during  the  transition  and  reform 
process  (Bartsch  1998;  Dakowska  2005a,  
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b;  Phillips  1999).  In  particular,  the 
transnational party networks around the EP 
are  familiar  territory  for  the  political 
foundations (Dakowska 2005b).  
The dissolution of the Soviet Bloc led 
European  political  parties  to  search  for 
potential  partners  among  the  emerging 
political families of the CEEC (De Waele 
and Delwit 1998). In the first half of the 
1990s,  both  the  Socialist  and  Christian 
Democrat  International,  as  well  as  the 
European  party  federations  and  the 
national  parties,  undertook  a  number  of 
initiatives,  including  visits,  electoral 
campaign  training,  material  aid  and 
invitations  to  party  congresses.  After  the 
formal launch of the enlargement process, 
EU  party  federations  switched  from 
informal dialogue to a closer co-operation 
with  potential  partners  and  started  to 
affiliate  them.  During  this  process  the 
European  party  federations  delegated  a 
number  of  tasks  to  the  political 
foundations.  Because  of  their  personal 
contacts in European party federations, in 
which the German political parties have a 
strong position, the field representatives of 
the  German  foundations  were  able  to 
influence  the  admission  process  in  an 
informal  way.  On  the  one  hand,  they 
helped western European parties to identify 
their partners and assessed their readiness 
to be admitted as an observer or associate 
member of a transnational party federation. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  German  political 
foundations were able to offer a range of 
‘European  political  resources’  to  their 
partners  from  the  CEEC  due  to  their 
knowledge  of  European  issues,  access  to 
information  and  personal  relationships 
with top EU decision-makers (see Kauppi 
2005).  
Facing  the  development  of  the 
foundations’ international activities and the 
budgetary  restrictions  at  the  domestic 
level,  a  growing  number  of  foundations 
vied to be recognised by the Commission. 
The German foundations took the lead in 
this  mobilisation,  insisting  on  their 
expertise  and  experience  of  development 
co-operation. However, the task proved to 
be  a  difficult  one.  The  Commission 
officials  were  reluctant  to  recognise  the 
political foundations as legitimate partners 
because of their party affiliation and their 
national  profile.  Marked  by  a  ‘political 
culture of compromise’ (Abélès and Bellier 
1996),  the  Commission  seeks  to  be 
perceived  as  an  institution  independent 
from  national  and  political  influences 
(Joana and Smith 2002; Smith 2004). The 
Commission  officials  were  reluctant  to 
allow  the  foundations  to  benefit  from 
European funds, considering that they were 
sufficiently financed by the German state. 
The  traditional  development  NGOs  were 
also  unwilling  to  share  their  funds  with 
German foundations.  
Consequently, in an attempt to change 
their  image,  the  German  foundations 
lobbied the cabinets of the Commissioners 
in charge of external relations. Aiming to 
counter the criticism of partisanship, they 
resorted to an argument of the pluralism of 
their  action  and  created  a  politically 
diversified steering committee in 1998. In 
order to overcome being labelled as purely 
national  structures,  foundations  co-opted 
partners  from  other  EU  countries.  This 
strategy  has  yielded  some  results,  as  the 
foundations  have  progressively  benefited 
from  the  PHARE  programme  and  from 
specific  instruments  of  the  EU 
development policy. However, in addition 
to  the  material  advantages,  symbolic 
recognition  was  the  greatest  concern  for 
the  foundations.  This  strategy  of  seeking 
access  to  the  Commission  has  led  to  the 
strengthening  of  formal  links  between 
foundations  active  in  the  democracy 
assistance field.  
 
Towards  a  European  profile  of 
democracy  assistance?  Competing 
networks 
 
Knocking  at  the  Commission’s  door,  the 
political  foundations  have  adopted  the  
GSPE Working Papers – Dorota DAKOWSKA – 05/29/2009  8 
strategy  of  other  interest  groups  seeking 
access and recognition at EU level (Coen 
2007).  As  the  Commission  favours 
dialogue  with  strong  and  representative 
Eurogroups  (Greenwood  2007),  the 
foundations sought to build a transnational 
structure that would fulfil this requirement 
and  demonstrate  their  independence  from 
political  parties.  This  was  an  ambitious 
task  for  political  foundations  since  they 
were  anchored  in  a  specific  national 
context.  The  collective  action  undertaken 
by  the  foundations’  incipient  networks 
shows  that  behind  the  apparently 
converging  strategies,  different  ideas  and 
worldviews compete with each other. One 
of the main tensions among the European 
foundations,  socialised  in  different 
institutional  contexts,  was  the  distinction 
between  a  ‘pluralist’  and  a  ‘multi-party’ 
approach. 
The  co-operation  of  national  political 
foundations  at  the  European  level  stems 
from  an  informal  international  co-
ordination of foundations active in the field 
of  democracy  promotion.  The  issue  of 
reinforcing  the  European  dimension  of 
democracy assistance gained ground after 
the  attacks  of  11  September
  2001.  The 
debate  was  launched  in  Paris  in  2003 
during a meeting of the emerging, but still 
informal, network of European foundations 
for democracy. The fact that the date of the 
meeting coincided with the US invasion of 
Iraq  reinforced  the  shared  feeling  that  a 
common European strategy was necessary 
to offer an alternative to the military forms 
of imposing democracy. However, beyond 
the  general  consensus  on  the  need  to 
enhance  a  European  dimension  of 
democracy  assistance,  the  issue  became 
highly  contested  as  soon  as  practical 
solutions were discussed. 
This  first  network  of  European 
foundations  and  institutes  active  in  the 
development  co-operation  was  created  in 
July 2004, at a conference on the European 
profile of democracy assistance, held in the 
Hague  and  organised  by  the  Netherlands 
Institute  for  Multiparty  Democracy 
(NIMD)  during  the  Dutch  presidency  of 
the EU. The conference ended with a joint 
statement  from  the  participating 
organisations (Hague statement 2004, van 
Doorn  and  von  Meijenfeldt  2007). 
However, beyond a general consent on the 
need to develop European best practices in 
democracy  promotion,  the  network 
members’ visions diverged. In the EP, the 
network initiated by the NIMD cooperated 
with the European Democracy Caucus, an 
informal all-party group of MEPs set up in 
2005  to  promote  democracy  and  human 
rights in the EU’s neighbouring countries 
and  chaired  by  Edward  McMillan-Scott 
(Conservative  UK,  EPP-ED).  At  the 
request  of  the  Democracy  Caucus,  David 
French,  the  director  of  the  British  WFD, 
and Roel von Meijenfeldt, the director of 
the NIMD, drafted a proposal to create a 
European  Foundation  for  Democracy 
through  Partnership  (French,  von 
Meijenfeldt  and  Youngs  2007).  In  the 
spring of 2006, when the NIMD published 
the  proposal,  the  network  split.  The 
German  political  foundations  were  the 
main  secessionists.  They  created  an 
alternative European Network of Political 
Foundations  (ENoP)  in  October  2006, 
inviting their partners to join.  
This  split  unveils  two  divergent 
perceptions of democracy promotion. The 
apparently  common  objective  concealed 
competing formal structures and normative 
beliefs  linked  with  different  institutional 
traditions.  According  to  the  ‘multi-party’ 
vision  –  of  the  British  and  the  Dutch 
experts  –  there  is  a  single  best  way  to 
promote  democracy,  based  on  a  certain 
amount  of  procedural  solutions,  mainly 
electoral  and  constitutional  engineering. 
The  international  programmes  promoted 
by  the  NIMD  and  the  WFD  insist  on 
ensuring  that  elections  are  held  in  a 
transparent and non-violent manner. They 
further encourage inter-party co-operation 
by  opening  centres  for  multiparty 
democracy,  in  which  the  inter-party  
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dialogue  becomes  a  condition  for  further 
assistance.  These  formal  structures  and 
informal  beliefs  influenced  the  strategy 
pursued by the NIMD network at EU level. 
The objective was to set up one EU-wide 
foundation,  which  would  federate  and 
coordinate  the  activities  of  different 
national political foundations in the field of 
democracy assistance and provide flexible 
funding. 
This  objective  was  perceived  as  a 
threat by the German political foundations 
and  their  close  partners.  Linked  to  one 
particular  party,  these  organisations 
considered  that  the  idea  of  a  single,  all-
encompassing  foundation  called  into 
question their institutional rationale. Based 
on different normative beliefs, the German 
foundations prefer a sister-party approach. 
The main idea is that the prerequisite for 
establishing democracy is the existence of 
a  robust  political  party  system  and  party 
competition.  This  belief  stems  from  the 
constitutional role of political parties in the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  The 
importance  of  the  pluralism  of  political 
ideas  was  stressed  in  the  post-war 
democratisation  process.  The  strategy 
encouraging  heterogeneous  political 
foundations  to  promote  similar  political 
movements abroad has been qualified as a 
‘pluralist’  approach  by  the  German 
foundations,  as  opposed  to  the  ‘multi-
party’ approach. But this divergence is not 
only an ideological one. It also reflects a 
power  relationship  between  several 
national  political  foundations  in  Europe, 
struggling  for  the  official  recognition  of 
their  model  and  for  an  access  to  new 
resources.  Consequently  the  ENoP  was 
joined  by  French,  Dutch,  Austrian, 
Swedish, Greek, Spanish, and other single 
party foundations. 
This  case  shows  the  importance  of 
what Rhodes has called ‘traditions’, which 
inform  diverse  sets  of  beliefs  about  the 
public  sphere,  authority  and  power 
(Rhodes  2007).  However,  I  argue  that  a 
dilemma linked to a political contest on the 
right way to reform governance does not 
necessarily ‘push’ the actors to reconsider 
their  beliefs  and  traditions.  In  the  short-
term, rival positions may lead to a certain 
degree  of  compromise.  But  if  actors 
consider their core beliefs (Sabatier 1998) 
and preferences to be threatened, they may 
choose  the  ‘exit’  option  and  leave  the 
network. The network initially launched by 
the  NIMD  was  a  loose  ‘issue  network’ 
(Rhodes 1990), which did not manage to 
overcome  the  internal  dilemmas,  as  they 
were related to competing core beliefs.  
The ENoP is a structural answer to the 
criticism  originally  formulated  by  the 
Commission.  It  is  a  technical  network 
composed,  in  2008,  of  48  political 
foundations  from  21  European  countries 
acting  in  the  fields  of  democracy 
promotion  and  development  co-operation, 
with ideological ties to the five major party 
groups  represented  in  the  EP. The  ENoP 
aims  to  lobby  the  European  institutions, 
especially the Commission, to promote the 
integration  of  the  political  foundations  in 
the EU programmes (ENoP, April 2008). It 
is also conceived as a platform for dialogue 
and  communication  with  the  network 
members  and  other  stakeholders  of 
democracy promotion.  
From  the  beginning,  the  ENoP 
organised  meetings  with  EC  officials  to 
discuss  new  instruments  and  thematic 
programmes  of  the  EU  democracy 
promotion and development policy. Some 
of  these  instruments  have  been  formally 
opened  to  the  political  foundations, 
especially  the  European  Instrument  for 
Democracy  and  Human  Rights  (EIDHR). 
However,  the  members  of  the  network’s 
steering  committee  issued  suggestions  to 
the Commission officials calling for more 
flexibility in the allocation of funds.
2 The 
                                                 
2 See, for example, the ENoP recommendation on 
EIDHR Annual Action Plan 2008:  
 http://www.european-network-of-political-
foundations.eu/enop/index.php?id=133&module=n
ews-01-content&pid=0&mid=6  (accessed  1 
November 2008).  
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ENoP’s ambition is to act as a knowledge-
hub  in  two  ways:  by  informing  its 
members about the key EU instruments in 
the field of democracy promotion; and also 
by  incorporating  the  foundations’ 
experience, gained from their international 
work,  into  the  EU’s  policies  and 
programmes. 
The  ENoP  is  portrayed  as  a 
representative  and  politically  pluralist 
body. It is clearly geared towards members 
that  are  ‘close  to  but  independent  of  a 
political  party’  (ENoP  2008),  and  are 
represented either in a national parliament 
or  in  the  EP.  Its  transnational  character 
notwithstanding,  the  composition  of  the 
ENoP’s  leading  bodies  shows  the 
instrumental  role  initially  played  by  the 
German  foundations.  Five  out  of  nine 
representatives  of  major  EP  political 
groups in the first steering committee were 
German  (4  out  of  9  during  the  second 
term). During the first year of its existence, 
the  network  was  coordinated  by  a 
representative of the Christian democratic 
Konrad  Adenauer  Foundation  (KAS)  and 
located in its office in Brussels. In 2007, 
the  director  of  the  liberal  Friedrich 
Naumann  Foundation  (FNS)  office  in 
Brussels  was  entrusted  with  the  co-
ordination of the network.  
The  ENoP  appears  as  a  means  to 
balance  out  the  structural  inequalities 
between  the  foundations.  None  of  them 
enjoy  the  same  resources  as  the  German 
ones  and  many  members  of  the  network, 
especially  those  from  the  EU’s  new 
member  states,  have  very  limited 
resources.  In  the  first  years,  the  German 
foundations  have  entirely  financed  the 
network to enable the smaller foundations 
to participate in its activities. The network 
aims  to  ensure  a  transfer  of  expertise  in 
order to empower its weaker members and 
assist  them  in  accessing  EU  funds. 
However,  it  is  clearly  not  a  one-way 
relationship. To prove that they were not 
the  only  ones  to  push  in  favour  of  their 
recognition  at  EU  level,  the  German 
political foundations needed to have other 
similar organisations joining them. 
In  the  meantime,  the  NIMD  network 
engaged in a vigorous campaign promoting 
the  creation  of  a  European  multi-party 
foundation  for  democracy  and  mobilising 
the support of prominent politicians, such 
as  Václav  Havel, former  president  of  the 
Czech Republic. The European Foundation 
for  Democracy  through  Partnership  was 
officially launched on 15 April 2008 in the 
presence  of  European  Commission 
president, José Manuel Barroso. Renamed 
as  the  European  Partnership  for 
Democracy  (EPD),  a  network  of  15 
European  democracy  assistance 
organisations,  the  foundation  aims  to 
complement  existing  EU  democracy 
assistance instruments. Both the ENoP and 
the  EPD  networks  are  in  tune  with  the 
Commission’s  expectations  of 
transnational  policy  networks.  Both  have 
been  pushed  by  specific  actors,  who 
express  partly  divergent  views  on 
democracy  assistance.  Both  resemble  an 
epistemic  community,  i.e.  a  knowledge-
based network of individuals, which claims 
its authority on policy-relevant knowledge 
and  professional  standards  (Haas  1990). 
Whether  these  networks  are  likely  to  be 
accommodating,  cooperate  or  compete 
requires further investigation. 
 
The  European  Political  Foundations:  a 
constrained policy transfer 
 
The  creation  of  European  political 
foundations  is  another  initiative  meant  to 
reinforce the structures of political parties 
at  EU  level  and  their  contribution  to  the 
public  debate  on  European  issues.  This 
case could be analysed as an example of 
policy  transfer  between  the  national  and 
the supranational level. Policy transfer has 
been  defined  as  a  ‘process  by  which 
knowledge  about  policies,  administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one 
political system (past or present) is used in 
development  of  policies,  administrative  
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arrangements,  institutions  and  ideas  in 
another  political  system’  (Dolowitz  and 
Marsh 2000: 5). The European institutional 
system  stimulates  policy  transfer  as  it  is 
confronted with a deficit of legitimacy. To 
ensure  this  legitimacy,  the  Commission 
tends  to  copy  existing  organisational 
structures (Radaelli 2000).  
Formally,  the  advent  of  European 
political  foundations  is  the  result  of  the 
classical  co-decision  procedure  following 
the proposal of the Commission to revise 
the  existing  regulation  on  European 
political parties in 2007. However, a closer 
analysis  of  the  decision-making  process 
leading  to  this  new  regulation  provides 
evidence of the key role played by political 
entrepreneurs  in  the  EP  and  the  political 
foundations present in Brussels. This case 
is significant not so much for its financial 
impact, which remains limited in the first 
stage,
3  but  to  see  how  the  Commission 
tackles  a  politically  sensitive  and 
unprecedented  issue.  It  contributes  to  the 
analysis  of  the  Commission’s  role  as 
network broker (Borrás 2007).  
One of the key players in the creation 
of European political foundations was the 
EP  Committee  on  Constitutional  Affairs 
(AFCO)  with  its  German  Chairman  Jo 
Leinen (PES), who was the rapporteur on 
the Commissions’ proposal (EP 2007). As 
an  established  figure  of  European 
institutional affairs, Leinen had supported 
                                                 
3  On  the  basis  of  the  2007 Regulation,  European 
political parties received €10.6 million from the EU 
budget  in  2008  (€10.2  million  in  2007,  €10.8 
million  expected  in  2009).  European  political 
foundations  received  €5  million  (September-
December 2008). Before, the European foundations 
received €1 million from the pilot project launched 
by  the  Commission  (September  2007-August 
2008). They are expected to get €7 million in EU 
grants in 2009. These grants are comparable to the 
budgets of the small national political foundations 
but  are  insignificant  compared  to  the  German 
foundations’  budgets,  of  which  the  smallest,  the 
Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung  (RLS),  alone  received 
more than €17 million from federal grants in 2007. 
EU grants make up 85% of European parties’ and 
foundations’ total budgets (see table 1). 
the  Regulation  on  European  political 
parties,  which  was  adopted  in  2003.  He 
was also a strong proponent of establishing 
political foundations at the European level. 
The  Leinen  report  on  the  European 
political  parties  and  a  subsequent  EP 
resolution  issued  in  March  2006  have 
called on the Commission to find a way of 
financing  European  political  foundations 
which  could  complete  the  activities  of 
Europarties in the field of information and 
education.  After  a  long  period  of 
reluctance  from  the  Commission,  a 
window  of  opportunity  opened  at  this 
moment. 
The  official  recognition  of  political 
foundations  at  EU  level  cannot  be 
explained without taking into account the 
current  preoccupation  of  the  Commission 
to  strengthen  the  communication  on 
European  affairs.  In  the  aftermath  of  the 
negative  outcomes  of  the  French  and 
Dutch constitutional referenda in 2005, the 
Commission  launched  a  ‘Plan  D’  to 
promote  democracy,  dialogue  and  debate 
with  European  citizens.  This  initiative 
emerged  at  a  time  when  an  efficient 
communication policy had become a major 
priority  of  the  Community  institutions, 
aimed  at  generating  ‘(mass)  support, 
(citizen)  consent  and  (electoral) 
participation)’  (Aldrin,  Utard,  2008:  3). 
The  decision  to  enable  the  European 
political  parties  to  organise  transnational 
electoral campaigns and to create European 
political  foundations  appeared  as  an 
opportunity to stimulate public debate and 
citizen involvement. 
Technically, the establishment of direct 
contacts  and  constant  dialogue  between 
Leinen’s  office,  the  cabinet  of  the 
Commissioner Margot Wallström and the 
General  Secretary  of  the  Commission 
helped  the  project  develop  smoothly.  As 
Vice  President  of  the  Commission  in 
charge  of  Institutional  Relations  and 
Communication,  Wallström  strongly 
supported the project of creating European 
political foundations. Faced with renewed  
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questioning  of  their  legitimacy, 
Commission  officials  were  open  to 
innovative  solutions  which  could  help 
them to answer the public demand of more 
dialogue with the citizens.  
Before  the  formulation  of  the 
Commission’s  proposal,  a  series  of 
meetings  was  organised  between 
Commission  and  EP  representatives  to 
deliberate on this issue. Concurrently, the 
relevant rapporteurs in the EP committees 
(AFCO,  Budget)  and  the  leaders  of  the 
main Europarties met with representatives 
of the national political foundations, who 
strongly lobbied on this issue. Due to their 
presence in Brussels, the German political 
foundations  were  those  who  spoke  on 
behalf  of  their  partners  from  other 
countries.  The  directors  of  the  main 
foundations’  Brussels  offices  –  the  KAS, 
the FES, the FNS and the Green Heinrich 
Böll Foundation (HBS) – played a key role 
in  bringing  information,  organisational 
templates  and  arranging  contacts  with 
other  foundation  representatives.  These 
directors  were  senior  officials  with 
experience  of  democracy  promotion 
abroad  and  easy  access  to  the  European 
institutions, and thus they were considered 
as  experts.  The  fact  that  the  national 
foundations  had  already  been  assembled 
into a network was a helpful argument in 
favour  of  the  universality  of  the 
foundations’  model.  The  Leinen  report 
explicitly  cited  the  ENoP,  stressing  that 
‘political foundations linked to parties are 
a  feature  of  many  Member  States,  and 
cross-border co-operation between political 
foundations  can  already  be  seen  in  a 
number of forms’ (EP 2007: 11). 
In  its  June  2007  proposal  published 
after  consultations  with  different 
stakeholders  (the  European  political 
parties,  but  also  the  ENoP  network),  the 
Commission  defined  the  ‘political 
foundations  at  European  level’  as  ‘an 
entity  or  network  of  entities  which  has 
legal  personality  in  a  Member  State,  is 
affiliated with a political party at European 
level  and  which  through  its  activities 
underpins and complements the objectives 
of  the  European  political  party  by 
performing,  in  particular,  the  following 
tasks’.  First,  the  European  foundations 
were meant to analyse and contribute to the 
debate  on  the  European  integration 
process; secondly to organise conferences, 
training  and  studies  on  European  issues; 
lastly, to serve as a framework for national 
political foundations, academics, and other 
relevant  actors  to  work  together  at 
European  level  (European  Commission 
2007a).  This  definition  is  based  on  the 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  ‘political 
foundations already play an important role 
in national political systems’ due to their 
capacity ‘to undertake different and more 
long-term activities from political parties at 
European  level’  (European  Commission 
2007  a:  4-5).  This  argumentation  shows 
that referring to successful solutions at the 
national level is a way to justify transfer. 
Domestic  institutions  provide  a  type  of 
‘anchor’  for  the  mimetic  isomorphism  at 
EU level (Radaelli 2000). 
The  question  here  is  whether  the 
project  to  establish  European  political 
foundations  can  be  considered  as  an 
uncontested issue in the EP. As it enabled 
the  strengthening  of  resources  and 
widening  of  the  scope  of  action  of  the 
European  political  parties,  most  of  the 
groups  and  parties  supported  the  idea. 
However,  there  was  a  certain  amount  of 
debate  and  hesitation,  especially  in  the 
European People’s (EPP). The EPP already 
had several affiliated think tank networks 
and  foundations,  and  there  were 
divergences  about  how  to  accommodate 
these  existing  structures  within  the  new 
foundation.  Finally,  the  leaders  of  the 
major  European  parties  –  the  EPP,  the 
Party  of  European  Socialists  (PES),  the 
European  Liberal,  Democrat  and  Reform 
Party  (ELDR),  and  the  European  Green 
Party (EGP) – promoted the issue during 
discussions with national political parties. 
Once  the  co-decision  procedure  was  
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launched,  these  leaders  also  engaged  in 
convincing  members  of  the  national 
governments to approve the proposal in the 
Council.  
After relatively smooth communication 
between the Commission and the political 
level of EP, resistance came from the side 
of the Council. Despite concerns about the 
added  value  of  the  European  political 
foundations,  the  main  criticism  did  not 
address the provisions on the foundations, 
but  the  European  political  parties.  It 
addressed  the  possible  derogations  of  the 
financial  regulations,  especially  from  the 
non-profit rule, i.e. the possibility for the 
political parties to set aside reserves and to 
postpone the execution of their programme 
for  three  months  of  the  following  year. 
This  criticism  came  mainly  from  the 
British,  Dutch,  German,  Danish  and 
Austrian  representatives,  but  Finland, 
Sweden  and  Latvia  also  expressed  some 
concerns.  They  were  backed  by  the 
Council’s  legal  service,  which  strongly 
criticised  the  proposal.
4  Additionally, 
Ireland  opposed  the  provisions  on 
financing  European  election  campaigns 
because  of  its  national  legislation.  The 
Commission’s  secretary  general  tried  to 
accommodate  these  arguments.  Searching 
for  a  consensus,  the  EPP  President,  the 
Belgian Wilfried Martens, played a similar 
role  as  during  the  first  regulation  on 
Europarties  by  attempting  to  win  the 
support  of  the  national  executives 
(Johansson  and  Raunio  2005).  The 
opposition, which had to be overcome in 
the Council, confirms the fact that ‘lesson-
drawing  is  part  of  a  contested  political 
process’ (Rose 1993: 6). 
Some institutional arrangements which 
preceded  and  influenced  the  2007 
                                                 
4 Finally, the proposal led to the adoption of two 
separate regulations: Regulation 1524/2007 revising 
the 2003 Regulation on European political parties 
and  Regulation  1525/2007  revising  the  Financial 
Regulation applicable to the general budget of the 
EU, softening the non-profit rule of European party 
financing. 
Regulation  should  be  mentioned.  After 
some  unsuccessful  attempts,  the  political 
entrepreneurs  promoting  the  idea  of 
European  political  foundations  in  the  EP 
convinced  the  Commission  to  launch  a 
‘pilot project’ to support the development 
of  these  foundations.  The  idea  was  to 
ensure a permanent funding mechanism for 
European  political  foundations,  as  the 
existing  Regulation  was  under  revision. 
After the EP had introduced a budget line 
to  the  2007  EU  budget,  the  execution  of 
the pilot project was entrusted to the DG 
Education  and  Culture  (DG  EAC). 
Previously,  personal  contacts  between 
Leinen’s  office  and  high-ranking 
representatives  of  the  Commission  (the 
Secretary  General  and  Wallström’s 
cabinet,  but  also  the  Cabinet  of  the 
Commission’s President Barroso) had been 
crucial in the process. 
This unprecedented project confronted 
the  Commission’s  services  with  some 
dilemmas. The call for proposals of the DG 
EAC  created  a  de  facto  monopoly 
situation,  as  the  definition  of  applicants 
was very narrow, i.e. it was only addressed 
to the European political parties, explicitly 
named.  The  Commission’s  civil  servants 
faced  a  politically  sensitive  problem, 
which was followed at the highest level of 
the Commission, and subject to the strong 
lobbying  of  the  EP  and  of  the  national 
foundations.  As  evaluating  the  political 
content  of  Europarties’  proposals 
concerning their new foundations appeared 
as  a  ‘mission  impossible’  to  the 
Commission’s  officials,  they  decided  to 
share  the  available  funding  according  to 
the  rules  established  by  the  2003 
Regulation on European political parties.
5 
Consultations  and  meetings  with  the 
representatives of the European parties and 
of the national foundations were organised. 
As  a  result,  the  Commission  agreed  to 
guarantee  a  maximum  of  flexibility, 
                                                 
5 This means that 15% is distributed in equal shares 
and  85%  is  divided  proportionally  in  accordance 
with the number of elected MEPs.  
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allocating up to 90% of the total financing 
to  the  new  foundations  and  accepting 
contributions  in  kind.  The  pilot  project 
reached the goal of stimulating the creation 
of 10 European political foundations able 
to fit the rules set by the 2007 Regulation. 
The eagerness in implementing these legal 
provisions was linked to the perspective of 
the 2009 European elections, to which the 
European political parties and foundations 
are expected to contribute.  
 
As of 2008, all Europarties have set up 
their foundations (see table 1). While the 
degree of proximity to the respective party 
seems  to  be  variable,  most  of  these 
foundations include representatives of the 
party, the political group in the EP and the 
national  political  foundations.  While  the 
co-ordination of their activities takes place 
in Brussels, most of their activities should 
be decentralised at EU member state level. 
The Regulation states that the foundations’ 
governing  bodies  shall  have  a 
geographically balanced composition.  
However,  the  German  expertise  and 
resources  were  definitely  instrumental  in 
setting  up  these  new  structures.  In  most 
cases,  the  first  secretary  general  or 
executive  director  of  the  main  newly 
established  European  foundations  is  a 
German  foundation  representative.  The 
President of the Liberal foundation, MEP 
Alexander  Lambsdorff,  is  the  son  of  the 
President of the German FNS, Count Otto 
Lambsdorff.  The  general  secretary  of  the 
PES foundation is the director of the FES 
Brussels  office,  Ernst  Stetter.  The  same 
logic  operates  for  the  Green  Foundation. 
On the far left, the Transform! Network of 
Marxist,  communist  and  socialist 
foundations launched by the German Rosa 
Luxemburg  Foundation  (RLS)  was 
recognised  by  the  European  Left  Party 
(EL)  during  the  Prague  Congress  in 
November 2007 as its political foundation. 
Due  to  the  strong  involvement  of 
German  MEPs  and  foundation 
representatives, is it possible to speak of a 
transfer of the German model of political 
foundations  to  the  European  level?  The 
answer  has  to  be  nuanced.  Clearly,  the 
intellectual  background  of  this  initiative 
and a large part of the mobilisation during 
the inter-institutional process leading to the 
2007  Regulation  has  to  do  with  the 
promotion  of  the  German  model.  In  no 
other  European  country  do  the  political 
foundations have such a strong position in 
the political system. Without the lobbying 
of the political foundations backed by the 
mobilisation in the EP, this new proposal 
would not have come into being. However, 
by wishing to export this successful model 
to  the  supranational  level,  the 
entrepreneurs  analysed  had  to 
accommodate  the  legal  and  procedural 
constraints.  The  fact  that  the  EC  Treaty 
recognises  –  in  Article  191  –  the  crucial 
role  played  by  political  parties  at  the 
European level provided the legal basis for 
the 2003 Regulation on European political 
parties. Thus, the unique way to fit in the 
idea  of  developing  European  political 
foundations was to adhere to the existing 
Regulation  while  closely  affiliating  these 
foundations  with  the  Europarties.  As  a 
result  the  European  foundations  have  to 
submit  their  applications  for  funding 
through the political party at the European 
level  they  are  linked  with,  even  if  a 
separate budget line is created.  
This  close  relationship  between 
foundations and political parties is a major 
difference in comparison with the German 
case, where a formal separation is the rule. 
This  is  why  the  creation  of  European 
foundations  may  be  qualified  as  a 
constrained policy transfer. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Considering  networks  as  more  than  a 
metaphor,  this  article  empirically 
reconsiders  the  changing  relationship 
between  the  EU  institutions  and  the 
political foundations networks. The recent 
reorientation  of  the  EU’s  external  
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instruments and the Commission’s efforts 
to  improve  communication  on  EU  public 
policies have opened new perspectives for 
the  structuring  of  the  foundations’  field. 
The  experience  of  party  affiliated 
foundations,  gained  in  the  context  of 
democratisation  and  during  EU 
enlargement,  has  allowed  them  to  act  as 
experts  during  consultations  with 
Commission  officials.  Nevertheless, 
knowledge  alone  was  not  sufficient  to 
counter  the  Commission’s  criticism  of 
partisanship.  This  is  why  political 
foundations engaged in building networks 
like  other  interest  groups  before  them. 
After the first foundations’ network split, 
other  structures  emerged  around  more 
consensual  institutional  traditions. 
However,  in  both  cases,  horizontal  co-
operation  does  not  exclude  competition 
and power relations. The ability to speak in 
the name of other members of the network 
or  to  deliberate  directly  with  the  EP  and 
Commission  officials  is  a  privilege 
available  to  a  network’s  key  players. 
Compared  to  other  organisations,  the 
German  political  foundations  combine 
material  and  political  resources  and 
expertise, which optimise their access and 
leverage capacities in spreading the model 
of  political  foundations.  However,  the 
observed transfer is one that is incomplete 
and may lead to hybridisation.  
The European political foundations are 
entrusted with carrying out classical think 
tank  activities,  such  as  research,  debates 
and  also  –  similar  to  the  German  case  – 
political  training.  However,  as  the 
European foundations are transnational by 
definition,  they  may  combine  different 
traditions of political counsel and strategic 
policy analysis. As far as international co-
operation  and  development  assistance  are 
concerned,  the  European  foundations’ 
capacities  are  limited.  They  can  act  as 
advocates  of  democracy,  ‘developing  co-
operation  with  entities  of  the  same  kind’ 
(Regulation (EC) 1524/2007) and bringing 
together national political foundations and 
academics  at  the  European  level.  By 
recognising  networks  linking  national 
foundations,  such  as  the  ENoP,  the 
Commission services in charge of external 
relations  have  demonstrated  a  newfound 
appreciation  of  their  contribution  to 
democracy  promotion.  If  this  trend  is 
confirmed,  national  political  foundations 
and  their  networks  may  be  invited  to 
engage more actively in political contexts 
considered as particularly difficult, e.g. in 
Belarus,  Cuba,  and  elsewhere.  While  the 
creation  of  a  transnational  network  of 
democracy promotion professionals was an 
important step leading to their institutional 
recognition,  in  the  ENoP’s  case,  policy 
implementation  is  carried  out  by 
organisations  that  may  cooperate  but 
remain bound by their national contexts. 
European  political  foundations  are 
innovative types of transnational bodies, as 
they  are  meant  to  link  representatives  of 
political  parties,  political  groups,  youth 
movements and national foundations. The 
potential  policy  impact  of  these 
organisations  is  difficult  to  assess  since 
their  definitive  form  remains  to  be 
clarified. The political will expressed at the 
highest  level  of  the  Commission  to 
institutionalise these political think tanks is 
sometimes  perceived  as  a  sign  of  a  new 
consideration  of  party-related  policy 
analysis  in  EU  policy-making.  For  some 
authors, increasing party competition at the 
EU  level  could  be  a  panacea  for  the 
‘democratic deficit’ (Hix 2008). However, 
European  political  foundations  are  even 
more  eclectic  and  fragile  organisations 
than European political parties. Therefore, 
they currently seem unlikely to decisively 
shape  the  European  polity.  Whether  the 
European  foundations  will  engage  in  a 
broader  public  debate,  without  limiting 
themselves to ‘preaching to the converted’ 
or  acting  as  supplementary  socialisation 
arenas  for  party  youth  organisations, 
remains  an  open  question.  As  with  other 
EU-level  representation  and  coordination 
bodies, what is at stake for the European  
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foundations  is  to  find  the  right  balance 
between  a  Brussels-based  agenda-setting 
activity  and  a  means  of  communicating 
with broader domestic constituencies.  
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Table 1: The European political foundations (2008) 
 
European 
Foundation 
Affiliation  to 
European political 
party 
Decision-making bodies  EU  grants 
September 
2007-December 
2008 (€)* 
Centre for European 
Studies (CEE) 
European  People’s 
Party (EPP) 
Board  members:  Wilfried 
Martens, MEP (president) 
Joseph Daul (MEP),  
Antonio  López-Istúriz  (MEP), 
Peter Weilemann (director of the 
KAS Brussels office)  
Raymond Gradus (Director of 
the CDA Research Institute), 
János Martonyi (former Foreign 
Minister of Hungary), 
Margaretha af Ugglas (former 
Foreign Minister of Sweden; 
Chairman of the Jarl Hjalmarson 
Foundation), Yannis 
Valinakis (former Deputy 
Foreign Minister of Greece) 
Director: Tomi Huhtanen (EPP) 
Head of Research: Roland 
Freudenstein (former director of 
the KAS Warsaw office) 
1.814.028 
Foundation  for 
European 
Progressive  Studies 
(FEPS ) 
Party  of  European 
Socialists (PES) 
President: to be named 
Vice-Presidents:  Jesus  Caldera 
(PSOE,  president of  IDEAS 
Foundation, Spain), Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen  (PES,  Denmark) 
Karl Duffek, Treasurer (Director 
of the Dr.-Karl-Renner Institute, 
Austria) 
Henri  Nallet,  President  of  the 
Scientific  Council  (France) 
Secretary  general:  Ernst  Stetter 
(Director  of  the  FES  Brussels 
office) 
1.494.900 
European  Liberal 
Forum (ELF) 
European  Liberal, 
Democrat  and 
Reform  Party 
(ELDR) 
President:  Alexander  Graf 
Lambsdorff, MEP;  
Vice-President: Annemie 
Neyts-Uyttebroeck, MEP 
Treasurer: Thierry Coosemans 
(Centre Jean Gol, Belgique) 
Executive  Director:  Susanne 
Hartig (former FNS Officer) 
341.660 
Green  European 
Institute (GEI) 
European  Green 
Party (EGP) 
Presidents  of  the  board  of 
directors: Heidi Hautala (Finnish 
MP,  former  MEP),  Pierre 
Jonckheer (MEP) 
Secretary  general:  Claude 
Weinber  (director  of  the  HBS 
Brussels office) 
364.128 
Institute of European 
Democrats (IED) 
European 
Democratic  Party 
(PDE) 
Directors:  
President: Jean-Claude 
Casanova (Frankreich) 
CEO:  Luca  Bader  (Margherita 
284.520  
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Party, Italy) 
Directors: Gorka Agirre 
Arizmendi (Spain) 
Vytautas Gapsys (Lithuania) 
transform  Europe 
(TE) 
European  Left 
Party (ELP) 
First  legal  representative: 
Michael Brie (RLS). 
Managing  board:  Ruurik  Holm 
(Left Forum, Finland), Elisabeth 
Gauthier  (Espaces  Marx, 
France),  Haris  Golemis  (Nikos 
Poulantzas  Institute,  Greece). 
Coordinator:  Walter  Baier 
(former  leader  of  the  Austrian 
Communist Party, KPÖ) 
196.400 
EUROPA  – 
osservatorio  sulle 
politiche dell’unione 
Alliance  for 
Europe  of  the 
Nations (AEN) 
Gianluca  Brancadoro,  Rosario 
Cancila et al. (Italy) 
281.800 
Fondation  politique 
européenne  pour  la 
Démocrate (FPED)  
Alliance  des 
Démocrates 
Indépendants  en 
Europe (ADIE) 
  226.746 
Foundation  for 
European 
Democracy (FEUD) 
EU  Democrats 
(EUD) 
Board: John Anthony Coughlan 
(Irish  National  Platform), 
President;  Jens-Peter  Bonde 
(MEP,  Denmark),  Vice-
President; Pelle Christy Geertsen 
(Secretary,  Denmark);  Karoly 
Lorant (Treasurer, Hungary) 
126.060 
Centre  Maurits 
Coppieters (CMC) 
European  Free 
Alliance (EFA) 
President: Frans-Jos Verdoodt  127.888 
 
 
* EU grants from the pilot project and for 2008. 
Source: Author’s information from the Commission and the EP.  
GSPE Working Papers – Dorota DAKOWSKA – 05/29/2009  19 
References 
 
Abélès, M. and I. Bellier, I. (1996) La Commission européenne: du compromis culturel à la 
culture politique du compromis, Revue française de science politique, 46, 3, 431-56. 
Aldrin, P. and J-M. Utard (2008), The ambivalent politicisation of European communication. 
Genesis of the controversies and institutional frictions surrounding the 2006 White Paper. 
GSPE Working Papers, 10/28/2008, http://workingpapers.gspe.eu. 
Bartsch,  S.  (1998)  Politische  Stiftungen:  Grenzgänger  zwischen  Staaten-  und 
Gesellschaftswelt,  in:  W.-D.  Eberwein  and  K.  Kaiser  (eds.),  Deutschlands  Neue 
Außenpolitik. Munich: Oldenburg, 185-98. 
Borrás, S. (2007) The European Commission as Network Broker, European Integration online 
Papers (EIoP) 11, 1, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2007-001a.htm 
Bourdieu,  P.  (1981)  La  représentation  politique.  Eléments  pour  une  théorie  du  champ 
politique, Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 36-37, 3-24. 
Bouwen, P. (2002) Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: the Logic of Access, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 9, 3, 365-90. 
Börzel, T. A. (1998) Organizing Babylon – on the different conceptions of policy networks, 
Public Administration, 76, 2, 253-74. 
Carothers, T. (1999) Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve, Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
Coen, D. (2007) Empirical and Theoretical Studies in EU Lobbying, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 14, 3, 333-45. 
Dakowska, D. (2005 a) Die Arbeit der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Polen zwischen 1971 und 
der friedlichen Revolution, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 45, 325-52. 
Dakowska, D. (2005 b) German Political Foundations: Transnational Party Go-betweens in 
the  Process  of  EU  Enlargement.  In  W.  Kaiser  and  P.  Starie  (eds.),  Transnational 
European Union. Towards a Common Political Space. London: Routledge, 150-169. 
Dakowska,  D.  (2009)  Networking  of  Political  Foundations:  The  Catalytic  Effects  of 
Transition and the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement. In W. Kaiser, M. Gehler and 
B.  Leucht  (eds.),  Networks  in  European  Multi-Level  Governance.  From  1945  to  the 
Present. Vienna: Böhlau. 
De  Waele,  J-M.  and  P.  Delwit  (eds.) (1998)  La  Démocratisation  en  Europe  centrale.  La 
coopération paneuropéenne des partis politiques. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
Delwit, P., Külahci, E. and C. Van de Walle (eds.) (2001) Les fédérations européennes des 
partis. Organisation et influence. Bruxelles: Editions de l’ULB. 
Dolowitz, D. and D. Marsh (2000), Who learns from whom. A Review of the Policy Transfer 
Literature, Political Studies, 44, 343-57. 
Dolowitz, D. and D. Marsh (2000) Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in 
Contemporary Policy Making, Governance, 13, 1, 5-24. 
Dür, A. and D. De Bièvre (2007) Inclusion without Influence? NGOs in European Trade 
Policy, Journal of Public Policy, 27, 1, 79-101. 
Eising, R. (2007) The access of business interests to EU institutions: towards élite pluralism?, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 3, 384-403. 
European  Network  of  Political  Foundations  (April  2008),  About  ENoP.  Unpublished 
document. 
European Commission, (27. 6. 2007 a), COM (2007) 364 final, 2007/0130 (COD). Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation 
(EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and 
the rules regarding their funding (presented by the Commission)  
GSPE Working Papers – Dorota DAKOWSKA – 05/29/2009  20 
European  Commission  (27.  6.  2007  b)  press  release  IP/07/949,  Strengthening  European 
Democracy,  political  debate  and  voter  participation  in  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament.  Brussels, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/949&format=HTML&age
d=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 1 October 2008) 
European  Parliament,  Committee  on  Constitutional  Affairs,  (2007),  Draft  report  on  the 
proposal  for  a  regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European 
level  and  the  rules  regarding  their  funding  (COM(2007)0364  –  C6-0202/2007  – 
2007/0130(COD)), 24.7.2007, Rapporteur: Jo Leinen. 
Fondation  Jean-Jaurès  (2007)  Un  nouvel  outil  pour  la  gauche.  Le  réseau  européen  des 
fondations  sociales-démocrates, 
http://www.fondatn7.alias.domicile.fr/affiche_page.php4?IdSite=1&IdRub=133&Id=631 
(accessed 1 October 2008). 
French,  D.,  von  Meijenfeldt,  R.  R.  and  Youngs  (2007)  A  European  Foundation  for 
Democracy http://www.demdigest.net/. Enhancing the European Profile of Democracy 
Assistance, March 2007 (updated version, unpublished paper). 
Green Cowles, M. (1996) The EU Committee of Am Cham: the powerful voice of American 
firms in Brussels, Journal of European Public Policy, 3, 3, 339-58. 
Greenwood,  J.  (2007)  Interest  Representation  in  the  European  Union,  2
nd  ed.,  London: 
Palgrave. 
Guilhot, N. (2005) The Democracy Makers. Human Rights and International Order. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
 Hass,  P.  M.  (1992)  Introduction:  epistemic  communities  and  international  policy 
coordination, International Organization, 46, 1, 1-35. 
(The) Hague Statement on Enhancing the European profile of democracy assistance (2004), 
The Hague. 
Hamada, Y. (2007) The impact of the traditional business-government relationship on the 
Europeanization of Japanese firms, Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 3, 404-21. 
Hix, S. (1995) Parties at the European  Level and the  Legitimacy of EU Socio-Economic 
Policy, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33, 4, 527-54. 
Hix, S. and C. Lord (1997) Political parties in the European Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Hix, S. (2008) What’s Wrong With the European Union and How to Fix It?. London: Polity 
Press. 
Joana, J. and Smith, A. (2002) Les commissaires européens. Technocrates, diplomates ou 
politiques ? Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. 
Johansson, K.M. (1997) Transnational Party Alliances. Analysing the Hard-Won Alliance 
between  Conservatives  and  Christian-Democrats  in  the  European  Parliament,  Lund: 
Lund University Press. 
Johansson,  K.  M.  and  T.  Raunio  (2005)  Regulating  Europarties:  Cross-Party  Coalitions 
Capitalizing on Incomplete Contracts. Party Politics, 11, 5, 515-34. 
Kauppi, N. (2005) Democracy. Social Resources and Political Power in the European Union, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Kohler-Koch,  B.  and  R.  Eising  (eds.)  (1999)  The  Transformation  of  Governance  in  the 
European Union, London: Routledge. 
Le Galès, P. and M. Thatcher (eds.) (1995) Les réseaux de politique publique. Débats autour 
de policy networks, Paris: L’Harmattan.  
Mayntz, R. (1993) Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen, Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift, 24, 39-56.   
GSPE Working Papers – Dorota DAKOWSKA – 05/29/2009  21 
Mazey, S. and J.J. Richardson (1993) Lobbying in the European Community. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Michel  H.  (ed.)  (2005),  Lobbyistes  et  lobbying  de  l'Union  européenne.  Trajectoires, 
formations et pratiques des représentants d'intérêts, Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de 
Strasbourg, [Sociologie politique européenne]. 
Michel H. (2007), « La ‘société civile’ dans la ‘gouvernance européenne’. Eléments pour la 
sociologie d’une catégorie politique », Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n° 166-
167, mars 2007, p. 30-37. 
Ortuño  Anaya,  P.  (2002)  European  Socialists  and  Spain:  the  Transition  to  Democracy, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Pappi, F. U. and H.C.A. Henning (1998) Policy Networks: More than a Metaphor?, Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 10, 4, 553-75. 
Phillips, A. L. (1999) Exporting Democracy: German Political Foundations in Central-East 
Europe, Democratization 6, 2, 70-98. 
Pinto-Duschinsky,  M.  (1996)  International  Political  Finance:  The  Konrad  Adenauer 
Foundation and Latin America. In: L. Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimension of 
Democratization. Europe and the Americas. Oxford: OUP, 227-55. 
Quigley, K.F.F. (1997) For Democracy’s Sake. Foundations and Democracy Assistance in 
Central Europe. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
Radaelli, C. (2000) Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a 
Source of Legitimacy, Governance, 13, 1, 25-43. 
Radaelli, C. (2005) Diffusion without convergence: how political context shapes the adoption 
of regulatory impact assessment, Journal of European Public Policy, 12, 5, 924-43. 
Regulation (EC) No 1524/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council (18 December 
2007) amending Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political 
parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding. 
Rhodes,  R.A.W.  (1990)  Policy  Networks.  A  British  Perspective,  Journal  of  Theoretical 
Politics, 2, 3, 293-317. 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (2003) Putting People Back into Networks, Australian Journal of Political 
Science, 37, 3, 399-416. 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (2007) Understanding Governance: Ten Years On, Organization Studies, 28, 
8, 1243-64. 
Rose, R. (1991) What is Lesson-Drawing?, Journal of Public Policy, 11, 1, 3-30. 
Rose, R. (1993) Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. 
Sabatier,  P.  A.  (1998) The  Advocacy  Coalition  Framework.  Revisions  and  Relevance  for 
Europe, Journal of European Public Policy, 5, 1, 98-130. 
Saurugger,  S.  (2001)  A  fragmented  environment:  interest  groups  and  the  Commission’s 
bureaucratic sectorisation, Politique européenne, 5, 45-69. 
Schuman Foundation, La Fondation Robert Schuman au cœur de l’Europe, http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/fr_frs_fondation_robert_schuman.php (accessed 1 October 2008). 
Smith,  A.  (ed.)  (2004)  Politics  and  the  European  Commission.  Actors,  Interdependence, 
Legitimacy, London: Routledge. 
Stone, D. (2000) Non-governmental Policy Transfer: The strategies of Independent Policy 
Institutes, Governance, 13, 1, 45-62. 
Stone,  D.  and  A.  Denham  (eds.)  (2004)  Think  Tank  Traditions:  Policy  Analysis  Across 
Nations. Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
True, J. and M. Mintrom (2001) Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of 
Gender Mainstreaming, International Studies Quarterly, 45, 1, 27-57.  
GSPE Working Papers – Dorota DAKOWSKA – 05/29/2009  22 
van Doorn, M. and R. von Meijenfeldt (eds.) (2007) Democracy, Europe’s Core Value? On 
the European Profile in World-wide Democracy Assistance, Delft: Eburon. 
Wagner, C. (1994) Die offiziöse Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik der deutschen politischen 
Stiftungen  in  Lateinamerika.  In:  M.  Mols  and  C.  Wagner  (eds.),  Deutschland  – 
Lateinamerika.  Geschichte,  Gegenwart  und  Perspektiven.  Frankfurt  a.M.:  Verwuert 
Verlag. 
Weisbein, J. (2003) Sociogenèse de la « société civile européenne », Raisons politiques, 5-7, 
10, 125-37. 
 